



SHORT-CHANGED

**How Congress
and Special Interests
Benefit at the Expense
of the American People**



Jean Cobb

THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY

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Benefit at the Expense of the American People**

By Jean Cobb

THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY

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“The object of government is the welfare of the people. The material progress and prosperity of a nation are desirable chiefly so far as they lead to the moral and material welfare of all good citizens.”

Theodore Roosevelt

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SUMMARY

When the Constitution was written more than 200 years ago, the founding fathers sought to create a participatory democracy, based on the ideal of one man, one vote, and equal **representation** in government for all. Today, however, that ideal is being subverted by the system of financing congressional campaigns. With the costs of campaigns skyrocketing, members of Congress are becoming increasingly dependent on special interest campaign contributions for their political survival. Monied special interests are taking advantage of this dependency by pouring millions of dollars each year into congressional campaign coffers, largely through political action committee donations. These contributions are often targeted to incumbents who, through committee assignments or other powerful positions, have a direct influence over legislation affecting those interests.

Today, the public's voice is being lost in the halls of Congress. The norm has become not one man, one vote, but rather one dollar, one vote. And when special interests buy access to and influence over the legislative **process**, taxpayers and consumers lose out, whether it be through tax **breaks**, subsidies or other legislative favors for special interests.

It is virtually impossible to document why members of Congress vote the way they do on any number of bills, and even harder to prove that money was a factor in their decision. And it is impossible to know why a particular interest group — **be** it sugar growers, the insurance industry, or the gun lobby — **chooses** to give to an **incumbent's** reelection campaign. It may be "repayment" for past favorable votes, hopes for future favorable votes, or simply a kind of insurance payment.

While motivations are difficult to measure, patterns do emerge when votes are compared with campaign contributions. This Center REPORT documents a number of cases in which it appears that money was a factor in the way members voted on specific pieces of legislation or amendments. In addition, it illustrates how these votes are hurting taxpayers and consumers through lost revenue and higher prices.

For example:

- The federal government's generous sugar price support program costs consumers \$3 billion each year in higher sugar prices. Eighty-five percent of senators who received \$ 15,000 or more from sugar interests voted *against* curtailing the price support program. Senators who received no contributions from the sugar industry all voted to reduce the program.
- After receiving an average of more than \$56,000 in campaign contributions from insurance interests, two House incumbents switched to the industry's side on a key committee vote on a bill that would take away the current exemption the industry enjoys from federal antitrust laws, thus lowering insurance premiums because of increased competition. The average industry contribution to individual committee members voting in favor of the industry was \$44,030, with those voting against the industry taking in an average of just **\$16,300**.
- In an 11-day period last September between two key Senate votes on a bill that would have raised auto efficiency standards — and saved consumers \$40 billion a year at the gas pumps — a single auto industry PAC gave more than \$30,000 to key incumbents, while other auto interests handed out another \$9,000. Two of them later sided with the industry on a close vote in which the industry won by just three votes.

- After utility interests gave more than \$300,000 in campaign contributions to members of the House Ways and Means Committee, a bill which would have required utility companies to quickly rebate \$19 billion in overcharges to consumers was defeated. The number of members who received \$10,000 or more from utility PACs was nearly twice as likely to vote in favor of the industry.

These are just a few examples of the kind of wheeling and dealing that goes on in Congress every day. However, there are proposals being considered which would change the system and make it more difficult for special interests to buy influence in the legislative arena. Among the ideas being debated on Capitol Hill include a system of partial or full public financing of campaigns, similar to the presidential system. Some proposals would tax political action committees to pay for public financing. Others suggest spending limits on campaigns; banning political action committee contributions, or establishing an aggregate limit on special interest contributions; banning contributions from special interests that have a direct interest in legislation before a member's committee; and setting term limits. There are also proposals which would limit campaign time to perhaps 30 or 60 **days**, thus cutting down on exorbitant costs of campaigns.

Whatever reforms are ultimately implemented, it is quite clear that the current system needs to be changed. By pouring huge sums of money into the campaign coffers of incumbents who sit on the relevant House and Senate **committees**, various special **interests** effectively control those committees and thus Congress. If we expect future legislation to benefit the public at large, then Congress and those committees *must* declare their independence.

Only then will this nation begin to return to a system of government which is truly of the people, by the people and for the people.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps more than any other scandal in American history, the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s exposed the corrupting influence of money in the political process. After lengthy congressional investigations and public hearings, numerous examples were uncovered of big money, in the form of legal and illegal campaign **contributions**, buying influence in the Nixon White House. In 1974, following those revelations, Congress passed legislation that instituted a system of partial public financing for presidential elections. By having taxpayers foot part of the **bill** for presidential elections, Congress hoped to stem the influence of special interests in the political and legislative arenas.

However, Congress refused to clean its own house. That same year Congress opened the door for special interests to establish political action committees (PACs), greatly increasing special interest contributions to congressional campaigns and influence over the legislative process. Since 1974, PAC spending has increased 12-fold, from \$12.5 million to \$150 million in 1990. Numerous studies have shown a connection between campaign contributions and the way members of Congress vote on particular pieces of legislation. A recent Common Cause study of National Rifle Association contributions documented how large campaign donations may have been a factor in the defeat of legislation that would have banned the domestic production and **sale** of semiautomatic rifles — a move supported by a large majority of the American public. Despite public pressure to ban the weapons, Congress gave in to NRA influence in a vote on the “**Unsoeld** amendment.” The amendment, sponsored by Representative Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA), allowed domestic gun manufacturers to continue to produce and sell semiautomatic rifles as long as they manufactured them in the United States. In vote after vote on the amendment, the pattern was clear: The more money a particular member of Congress received from the NRA, the more likely he or she was to vote in the **NRA’s** favor (see Appendix IV).

Since 1974, Congress has come under increasing pressure to reform its campaign finance system. Proposals have ranged from a complete ban on **all** PAC contributions to campaign spending limits. Also being seriously considered, and widely supported, is a system of public financing, similar to the presidential system, designed to stem or eliminate the flood of special interest money now pouring into congressional campaign coffers.

Some opponents of public financing for congressional campaigns have argued that such a system would be too costly — about \$300 million per year, according to some estimates. But an argument can also be made that the *current* system of financing congressional campaigns is more costly to consumers and the U.S. Treasury — in other words, the taxpayer — than public financing would be. Through special-interest tax breaks, subsidies, and other legislative favors doled out to large campaign donors, billions of dollars are being frittered away each year for programs of dubious public value or through the defeat of legislation in the public's interest.

This Center REPORT documents cases in which it appears that money played a role in whether particular pieces of legislation — affecting taxpayers and consumers — passed or failed.

METHODOLOGY

It's virtually impossible to prove that campaign contributions can influence congressional votes, since there is no systematic way to document what makes members of Congress vote the way they do on the thousands of bills that come before committees and the full House and Senate each year. What can be shown, however, are **patterns**: In many cases, the more money a member of Congress receives from a particular special interest **group**, the more likely he or she is to vote in favor of that interest or industry.

For this study, the Center examined dozens of issues and special interests, from the largest donors, such as the insurance and banking industries, to groups with well-known lobbying clout, such as the sugar and cable-television industries. Important votes over the past few years were analyzed, along with the contributions members of Congress received from those special interest groups. The Campaign Research Center, an organization that has computerized campaign contributions as reported to the Federal Election Commission and categorized political action committee donations according to interest group, tallied total campaign contributions to all members of Congress or to members of key committees. When possible, those contributions were compared to votes for or against a **particular** special interest to determine if members who received large amounts of money from a particular interest group were more likely to vote in its favor.

In many cases such straightforward documentation is not possible. As any veteran of Capitol **Hill** will attest, a special interest group's clout can be seen not just through winning votes, but from *preventing* a particular bill from ever coming to a committee or floor vote. An industry's case may also be made in **conference** committees between members of the House and Senate, where final legislation is hammered out behind closed doors. In those cases, contributions to key committees — those with jurisdiction over a particular piece of legislation, and the Rules committees, which often control whether a bill or specific amendments will come to a vote — were examined, as well as contributions to the House and Senate leadership, who also hold sway over when or if legislation will be voted on.

THE SUGAR PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM

COST TO CONSUMERS ANNUALLY: \$3 billion

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONGRESS SINCE 1985: \$2.6 million

There is little argument that the U.S. sugar industry has wielded enormous clout over Congress in the past decade. With a price support program more generous than for any other farm commodity, and import restrictions on cheaper foreign sugar, the industry has a lot to lose should it fall out of favor with Congress.

Since the 1700s, the U.S. government has protected the domestic sugar industry, mainly through import quotas. Since 1934, a succession of Sugar Acts has defined U.S. sugar policy by requiring the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate domestic sugar prices through quotas, benefit payments to growers, acreage restrictions, and excise taxes. In 1977, Congress established the current loan program, which since 1985 has guaranteed growers 18 cents per pound. That's a far cry from the world market rate, which in the 1980s averaged less than 10 cents per pound.

The effect has been to significantly increase the price of domestic sugar. A 1988 report by the U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that American consumers pay \$3 billion more for sugar each year than they would without such a program. A study by Public Voice, a nonprofit consumer lobbying group that has consistently criticized the sugar program, found that 11,000 farmers — less than 1 percent of all U.S. farmers — benefitted an average of \$250,000 per grower from the price support program in the mid-1980s.

In addition to these domestic costs, the sugar program has had a detrimental effect on developing countries, which depend on sugar exports as a source of revenue. In 1989, an international panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) found that the U.S. import quotas violated world trade rules.

Twice in the past five years the industry has beaten back attempts in Congress to gradually lower the government support it receives. In 1985 and again in 1990, Senators Bill Bradley (D-NJ), Slade Gorton (R-WA), and William Roth (R-DE) and Representatives Thomas Downey (D-NY) and Willis Gradison (R-OH) introduced amendments to the farm bills that would have lowered the price support level and brought domestic sugar prices more in line with the world market, increased sugar imports, and set a tariff rate quota mechanism that would have permitted increased imports in times of domestic price hikes.

In 1985, both the House and the Senate voted down the amendments after 17 sugar PACs poured more than \$900,000 over a 3-year period into congressional campaign coffers, according to a study by Public Voice. Heavily targeted were members of the House and Senate Agriculture committees. Despite broad support from a coalition of consumer groups, food processors, retailers, sugar refiners, and the Bush administration, the 1990 amendments met with similar results: The House voted 271-150 and the Senate voted 54-44 against curtailing the program.

At least 17 sugar PACs contributed \$2.6 million to congressional campaign committees between 1985 and 1990. Between 1988 and 1990 alone, individuals from the sugar industry kicked in another \$178,000. A vote-by-vote analysis of the House and Senate showed the expected pattern: The more money a member got from sugar interests, the more likely he or she was to vote in the industry's favor.

* * * * *

CONTRIBUTIONS BY 17 SUGAR PACS TO THE SENATE, 1985-1990

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Voted in Favor of Sugar Industry</u>	<u>Voted Against Sugar Industry</u>	<u>Percentage in Favor of Sugar Industry</u>
\$0	0	12	0%
\$1-\$5,000	4	16	20%
\$5,001-\$10,000	9	6	60%
\$10,001-\$15,000	12	5	71%
\$15,000 or more	29	5	85%

Final Vote 54 44

(Two senators did not vote)

Total
Contributions: \$994,467 \$279,881

Average
Contribution: \$18,416 \$6,361

TOTAL SENATE CONTRIBUTIONS — \$1,303,348*

*Total includes contributions to members who did not vote

CONTRIBUTIONS BY 17 SUGAR PACS TO THE HOUSE, 1985-1990

Amount	Voted Against Sugar Industry	Voted in Favor of Sugar Industry	Percentage in Favor of Sugar Industry
\$0	59	8	12%
\$1-5,000	80	92	53%
\$5,001-15,000	11	129	92%
More than \$15,000	0	42	100%
 Final Vote	 150	 271	
(12 members did not vote)			
 Total			
Contributions: \$206,990		\$2,387,188	
 Average			
Contribution: \$1,380		\$8,841	
 <u>TOTAL HOUSE CONTRIBUTIONS — \$2,649,778</u>			

*Total includes contributions to members who did not vote

(Note: See Appendix I for House and Senate vote-by-vote breakdown and PAC contributions to individual members)

FUEL EFFICIENCY STANDARDS

SAVINGS TO CONSUMERS: \$40 billion a year

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SENATE SINCE 1985: \$1.9 million

With the onset of the Persian Gulf War came a renewed interest in oil and energy conservation. According to the Energy Information **Administration**, an arm of the Department of Energy, the U.S. imported 290 million barrels of oil annually from Iraq and Kuwait. According to calculations based on Department of Energy figures by the Safe Energy Communication Council, a public interest group concerned with energy policy, that much oil could be saved by raising automobile fuel efficiency standards by a mere 2.75 miles per gallon — a 10 percent increase above the current legal mandate of 27.5 miles per gallon for all passenger cars.

Legislation to increase automobile fuel efficiency standards, introduced for the first time last year by Senator Richard Bryan (D-NV), came surprisingly close to being passed. A similar bill, introduced by Representatives Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Claudine Schneider (**R-RI**), never made it out of committees and to the House floor last year.

Bryan's bill would have required automakers to increase fuel efficiency by 20 percent by 1995 and 40 percent by the year 2001. The so-called CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) standards have not been raised since 1975, when the 27.5 m.p.g. standard was first implemented. It has been estimated that since then, the United States has saved 2.5 million barrels of oil every day, or more than 900 million barrels per year. Had the Bryan bill passed, the additional savings would have been between 1 million and 2.8 million barrels of oil a day. Based on government figures, the annual savings to consumers at the gas pump would have come to \$40 billion. There's also an environmental benefit: Fuel-efficient cars produce less carbon dioxide, the main culprit in global warming. Bryan estimates that if his plan were put into effect, carbon dioxide emissions would be reduced by 500 million tons a year.

The auto industry and the Bush administration opposed the bill on grounds that it was economically unfeasible for manufacturers and would result in lost jobs. They also contended that higher fuel-efficiency standards would mean lighter, and therefore less safe, cars. Proponents of the bill countered that the industry made the same arguments 15 years ago when the original fueleconomy standards were established. In addition, they pointed to a Department of Energy study which found that greater fuel efficiency can be achieved through technological advances — not lighter cars. The Bryan bill, which originally was part of the Clean Air package, was dropped in **March** in exchange for a promise for separate floor consideration later in the year. In mid-September, in an unusual **move**, proponents of the auto industry, led by Senator Don Riegle (**D-MI**), led a filibuster to keep the bill from being brought to the Senate floor for debate. The Senate, however, ended the filibuster by a vote of 68-28, and the bill was scheduled for debate on September 20. The auto industry and the Bush administration immediately shifted into high gear, mounting an intensive lobbying campaign against the bill. By September 25, another filibuster had prevented debate on the bill. A cloture vote, which would have ended the filibuster, and allowed debate — and eventually a vote — required a **three-fifths** majority, or 60 votes to pass. Between those two important votes, 11 senators who had previously voted against the auto industry changed their stance and voted in the industry's favor. The vote to invoke cloture fell just three votes short, 57-42, thus killing the legislation.

In that 11-day period between the two votes, the Auto Dealers and Drivers for Free Trade PAC, which represents foreign-car makers, handed out \$35,000 to 14 senators, while other auto interests gave another \$9,000 to seven senators. Two of these senators later switched their votes.

Bryan has introduced the bill again this year, as has Boxer in the House. The auto industry is expected to pull out all the stops to defeat the proposal. Judging from last year's efforts, proponents of the legislation in both houses of Congress will face tough battles in which money, no doubt, will be a contributing factor.

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CONTRIBUTIONS BY AUTO INDUSTRY PACS TO THE SENATE, 1985-1990:

Amt. Received	Voted Against Auto Industry on 9/25/90	Voted in Favor of Auto Industry on 9/25/90	Percentage in Favor of Auto Industry
\$0-\$11,999	28	5	15%
\$12,000-19,999	14	10	42%
\$20,000 or more	15	27	64%
Final Vote	57	42	
(One senator did not vote)			
Total Contributions	\$863,990	\$1,012,065	
Average Contribution:	\$15,158	\$24,097	
Total Contributions:		\$1,917,155*	

AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION TO 11 SENATORS WHO CHANGED POSITIONS AND VOTED WITH THE AUTO INDUSTRY ON THE SECOND VOTE: \$19,718

*Total includes contributions to member who did not vote

UTILITY CUSTOMER REBATE

REBATE TO CONSUMERS: \$19 billion

CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE (1985-1989): \$340,770

In 1989, the *Wall Street Journal* reported how utility companies, armed with more than \$10 million in campaign **contributions**, had killed a provision of the 1989 tax bill that would have expedited spending **refunds** to utility consumers because of industry overcharges. The *Journal* reported that the average residential customer would have received a rebate of \$100.

The proposed rebate would have reflected a total of \$19 billion in deferred taxes, which had already been billed to customers before changes in the 1986 tax reform bill that dropped the corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent, leaving the industry owing much less in taxes than had been previously anticipated. While no one disputed that the utilities owed consumers the taxes, the question was whether they would be paid back quickly or over a number of decades.

The sponsor of the 1989 provision to repay consumers quickly was Representative Robert **Matsui** (D-CA). Ironically, Matsui had also sponsored the original 1986 provision that allowed the refunds to be paid back over 30 years. With no public hearings on the matter, consumer groups and other interested parties didn't find out about the delay in paying the refunds until it was already law. State utility regulators, who normally oversee rebates to customers and consumer and labor groups, as well as 57 members of Congress, lined up behind the "Utility Ratepayer Refund Act of 1987," **sponsored** by Representative Byron Dorgan (D-ND). Dorgan's bill, which would have reversed the provision and provided for an immediate rebate of the overcharges, died in the Ways and Means Committee without a vote, and after nine of the original **cosponsors** had repudiated the bill. Of those **nine**, the *Wall Street Journal* reported eight received an average of \$13,057 in campaign contributions from the utilities.

Matsui, who received large campaign contributions from utility PACs after he sponsored the 1986 provision, began to turn against the utilities a year later as he came under fire from consumer groups. When he asked the utilities to give him more information to defend himself, Matsui told the *Journal* he got little more than offers for fundraising help.

One study, paid for by a telephone association, projected that telephone customers who got one-time, one-year refund of \$24 would lose out by paying \$40 in higher rates over the next 20 years. A rebuttal of that study, commissioned by Pennsylvania's Office of Consumer Advocate, said it contained "**faulty analysis**" and that a rapid refund would actually leave customers between \$7 million and \$356 million ahead over 20 years.

Matsui's bill eventually lost in the Ways and Means Committee, 13-22. "I have been told a number of times by members whom I have sought as cosponsors that my bill makes good policy sense but dangerous **political** sense to **them**," Matsui told the *Journal*. "Rich in honorariums and campaign contributions, their [utility lobbyists'] talk is pretty loud in the halls around **here**."

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS BY UTILITY PACS TO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 1985-89

Those members receiving \$10,000 or more from utility PACs were nearly twice as likely to vote in favor of the industry's position.

Vote/Contribution Breakdown

Voted Against the Utilities

**Matsui	\$32,425
Gibbons	14,300
Dorgan	11,300
Moody	10,650
Andrews	10,000
Rangel	8,575
Donnelly	8,450
Pease	6,000
Kennelly	3,615
Coyne	3,500
Downey	1,500
Stark	1,250
Gradison	<u>-0-</u>
TOTAL	\$111,565
AVERAGE	\$8,582

Voted in Favor of the Utilities

Flippo	\$36,600
Schulze	33,776
Rostenkowski	31,100
Anthony	17,450
Vander Jagt	16,840
Shaw	12,000
Guarini	11,189
McGrath	10,600
Levin	8,250
Russo	7,300
Pickle	6,850
Jenkins	6,550
Thomas	6,050
Frenzel	5,650
Ford	5,250
Chandler	4,400
Brown	3,500
Johnson	3,400
Sundquist	2,450
Jacobs	-0-
Archer	-0-
Crane	<u>-0-</u>

TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS: \$340,770

\$229,205

AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS: \$9,736

\$10,418

After sponsoring the original 1986 provision, **Matsui's contributions from utilities climbed to \$32,425. If those contributions were not included in the averages, the total to those voting against the industry would have been **\$79,140**, with an average of **\$6,595**.

INSURANCE INDUSTRY EXEMPTION FROM FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

COST TO CONSUMERS: Higher insurance premiums

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONGRESS SINCE 1985: \$21.5 million

In 1945 Congress passed the **McCarran-Ferguson** Act, which exempted the insurance industry from federal antitrust laws that disallow business practices such as price-fixing and monopolies. The purpose of the law was to allow **states**, rather than the federal government, to regulate the industry. It also provided for a three-year moratorium on the exemption, after which, in the absence of **effective** state regulation, federal antitrust regulations would apply. Because of ambiguous language in the law, however, the temporary moratorium became a permanent exemption. As a result, according to a report by the House Judiciary Committee, lax oversight and enforcement in a number of states have led to the proliferation of anti-competitive practices, including price-fixing.

There have been a number of proposals and attempts to place the insurance industry under greater federal regulation by removing or altering the antitrust exemption. A 1977 study of the industry by the Department of Justice questioned whether the exemption was in the public interest and concluded that "open competition" laws would be favorable to the industry. Following the study, President Jimmy Carter created a commission to study federal antitrust laws and various exemptions from the law. The McCarran-Ferguson exemption was discussed at length in the commission's report, which concluded: "**The** current broad antitrust immunity for the business of insurance granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be repealed."

By the 1980s, with the onset of the "insurance crisis," when premiums soared and some businesses and localities found it impossible to obtain adequate coverage, the industry once again came under scrutiny. Over a four-year period, a series of hearings were held by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law. In the hearings, industry representatives balked at the idea of repealing the exemption and maintained that the industry's huge losses — and the resulting crisis — **should** be blamed on skyrocketing jury awards. Consumer advocates insisted the "crisis" was brought on by the industry itself through ill-advised rate policies and irrational responses to a few large claims. The subcommittee subsequently undertook an investigation into the **industry's** claims and found that liability insurers had actually paid out far less in claims than they had received in premiums over the decade.

A 1986 report by the General Accounting Office found that rates for workers compensation insurance in Michigan in 1984 were at least 30 percent less than they would have been if that state **hadn't** adopted competitive rating provisions for the industry. It is still too early to know the effects of greater competition on rates in California and New Jersey, for example, where ballot initiatives have led to more state regulation of the insurance industry.

An industry's clout can often be measured not only by how many votes are won in Congress, but also by how many bills never come to a vote. Several bills have been introduced over the past few years that would either repeal or modify the insurance **industry's** exemption from antitrust laws.

The latest, H.R. 1663, introduced in the 101st Congress, represents the first time since 1945 that a bill to reform the exemption was voted on and passed at both the subcommittee and committee levels. The **bill**, sponsored by Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX), would allow antitrust laws to apply in cases of price-fixing, **monopolization**, allocation of territories by market rivals, and other unlawful business practices. The bill narrowly passed the subcommittee level in 1990 by a vote of 9-6. In 1990, the Judiciary Committee also passed the bill, by a vote of **19-16**. The legislation died, however, before it reached the House floor. Between 1988 and 1990, two members who received large contributions from the insurance industry switched from supporting the bill to opposing it.

A similar bill has been introduced in the last four Congresses by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH). It has never made it out of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights. One reason might be that insurance-industry contributions to members of the Senate committee have been unusually high.

Brooks's bill is expected to make it to the House floor this year. The close votes in both the committee and subcommittee may indicate a close vote on the House floor. And if the pattern of votes versus campaign contributions continues, money may make the difference in whether or not this pro-consumer legislation ever passes.

* * * * *

The 1990 House Subcommittee Vote on the McCarran-Ferguson Exemption and Industry Contributions (1985-1990)

<u>Voted Against the Insurance Industry</u>	<u>Voted in Favor of the Insurance Industry</u>																																						
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**1990 Vote on the McCarran-Ferguson Exemption by the
House Judiciary Committee:**

Voted Against the Insurance Industry

Schumer	\$76,990
Brooks	48,500
Bryant	39,150
Boucher	32,300
L. Smith (FL)	19,600
Mazzoli	17,400
Schroeder	13,150
Frank	13,000
Hughes	10,880
Staggers	8,500
Kastenmeier	6,295
Levine	5,350
Washington	4,250
Berman	4,200
Sangmeister	3,600
Conyers	3,135
Edwards (CA)	2,500
Crockett	800
Synar	<u>-0-</u>

Total Contributions **\$309,600**

Average Contribution \$16,294

Voted in Favor of the Insurance Industry

Morrison (CT)	\$89,334
Fish	74,863
Glickman	67,945
Douglas	67,800
Coble	64,157
Moorhead	51,825
Feighan	44,758
Dannemeyer	38,550
Sensenbrenner	36,783
L. Smith (TX)	36,350
Hyde	32,690
Campbell (CA)	29,550
Slaughter (VA)	28,950
DeWine	16,400
James	14,250
Gekas	<u>10,270</u>

\$704,475

\$44,030

**Two Members Who Switched From Voting Against the Insurance
Industry to Voting in Favor of the Industry:**

Glickman	\$67,945
Feighan	<u>\$44,758</u>

Total Contributions \$112,703

Average Contribution \$56,352

VOTES VS. CONTRIBUTIONS

Amount	Voted Against the Industry	Voted in Favor of the Industry	Percent in Favor of the Industry
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1990 Subcommittee Vote

\$0-9,999	3	0	0%
\$10-29,999	3	1	25%
\$30,000 or more	3	5	67%
Final Vote	9	6	

1990 Judiciary Committee Vote

\$0-\$9,999	10	0	0%
\$10-29,999	5	5	50%
\$30,000 or more	4	11	73%
Final Vote	19	16	

Contributions to House Leadership (1985-1990)

Speaker of the House Thomas Foley (D-WA)	\$ 88,637
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO)	172,578
Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL)	130,575
Majority Whip William Gray (D-PA)	67,700
Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA)	53,900
 Total Contributions	 \$513,390
Average Contribution	\$102,678

Contributions to the Senate Judiciary Committee

Total — \$902,553
Average — \$ **64,468**

Contributions to Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights

Total — \$575,159
Average — \$ 63,906

The Savings and Loan Debacle

COST TO TAXPAYERS: As much as \$500 billion over 30 years

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONGRESS FROM 1985-1987: \$1.8 million

For years, savings and loan institutions, or **"thrifts,"** earned their nickname. They thrived through prudent banking practices, commonly known as the 3-6-3 rule: Pay 3 percent interest on savings, charge 6 percent for home loans, and hit the golf course by three. But by the late 1970s and early 1980s, changing financial conditions had rendered that formula obsolete, as newly emerging money market funds and other high-interest bearing accounts sucked funds away from the ailing industry.

But that wasn't **all** that contributed to the impending disaster in the industry. As the savings and loan crisis quietly unfolded, it was helped along by legislation passed in Congress. In a series of far-reaching deregulatory moves, Congress raised the federal insurance on deposits from \$40,000 to \$100,000, loosened restrictions on the types of investments S&Ls could make (thus opening the door for risky ventures), and quickened the phase out of interest rate ceilings for thrift deposits. In addition, the Reagan administration loosened accounting procedures for thrifts, which allowed them to hide major losses from thrift regulators.

These and other changes in the way S&Ls were allowed to conduct business contributed to the **"high-flying"** mentality of the '80s thrift operators, which led to hundreds of thrifts failing and even more being cited by federal regulators as "problem" thrifts. In the meantime, delays in closing insolvent thrifts — delays the S&L industry lobbied hard for — added billions each year to the ultimate cost of the government bailout of the industry, now estimated at more than \$500 billion over the next 30 years.

While virtually all of these changes passed Congress easily and swiftly as more and more S&Ls began to fail, there was at least one close call for the industry when the Reagan administration recommended a \$15 billion bailout in the mid-1980s. In 1987, in a major victory for the industry, the House Banking Committee voted 25-24 to reject the administration's first request for \$15 billion to close down or take over ailing thrifts, voting instead for only \$5 billion in funding. Less funding meant that regulators could not move against problem thrifts that, as time wore on, went deeper and deeper into debt, thus increasing the ultimate cost of the government bailout. According to media reports, even White House officials privately conceded at the time that \$15 billion wasn't enough and that as much \$50 billion would be needed to rescue the industry. Instead of providing the \$15 billion, however, the House Banking Committee, "at the urging of the industry, House Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX), and Committee Chairman Femand St Germain (**D-RI**), voted for only \$5 billion. When the bill came to the full House for a vote, Wright and St Germain quietly switched their positions to support the administration, but did little else to support the higher bailout rate. Eventually, Congress and the Reagan administration agreed to \$10.8 billion.

A 1990 report by the General Accounting Office has estimated that this and other delays upped the ultimate cost of the bailout to as much as \$500 billion.

The Keating Affair and Other Ethical Questions

A number of members of Congress have been singled out in the media and by the House and Senate ethics committees as having used undue influence to aid the savings and loan industry. That influence, of course, was combined with large contributions from S&L PACs, individuals, and industry associations. House **Banking** Committee Chairman **Fernand** St Germain was cited by the House ethics committee for having violated House rules when he accepted free travel and meals from the S&L industry. St Germain was the banking committee's top recipient of S&L campaign contributions and played an instrumental role in advancing legislation that deregulated the industry.

House Speaker Jim Wright was investigated by the House ethics committee for using his power and influence to assist S&L operators. While the outside counsel investigating Wright recommended that the committee find him in violation of House rules regarding his **activities** with S&Ls, the committee rejected those recommendations. Nevertheless, Wright resigned two months later.

The most notorious case in the S&L debacle, of course, is Charles Keating, the Arizona millionaire who owned Lincoln Savings and Loan in Irvine, **California**. A 1987 article in the *New York Times* called Keating and his S&L "one of the most prominent examples of a new and controversial **breed** of savings and loan **institution[s]**" that downplayed the traditional role of home lending to underwriter riskier and potentially more lucrative **speculative** investments, such as **investing** in real estate developments.

In **1986**, federal regulators began investigating Lincoln's lending practices. Later that year they concluded that the S&L suffered from serious deficiencies in its underwriting, appraisal, and documentation practices. About that time, by his own admission, Keating began making generous corporate **donations**, campaign **contributions**, and gifts to influence members of Congress to "**take up my cause**." Five senators in particular received large sums of campaign money from Keating, his family, and his colleagues: Alan Cranston (D-CA), Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), John Glenn (D-OH), John McCain (D-AZ), and Don Kiegle (**D-MI**). The senators, who became known as "**the Keating Five**," received more than \$324,000 among them in campaign contributions from Keating. In addition, Keating gave more than **\$1** million to political causes and **organizations** that benefitted the senators, as well as corporate gifts, including vacations at Keating's retreat in the Bahamas.

In 1987, the senators met with federal S&L regulators on two occasions in an apparent attempt to press them to ease up on Lincoln Savings and close their investigation. Despite what appears to be extraordinary pressure from the five **senators**, the regulators recommended that Lincoln be taken over. With a change in chairmanship at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, two years went by without the **recommendation** being implemented. In April 1989, after several unsuccessful attempts to sell the S&L, Keating placed the thrift in bankruptcy proceedings.

The federal bailout of Lincoln is estimated to have cost the taxpayers at least \$2.5 billion. The two-year delay following the recommendation to take over the thrift is estimated to have cost **\$1.3** billion. Lincoln is thought to be one of the most expensive S&L failures ever.

**1987 House Banking Committee Vote to Reduce Funding for
S&L Bailouts From \$15 Billion to \$5 Billion and
S&L Campaign Contributions (1981-1986) ***

<u>Voted in Favor of the S&L Industry</u>		<u>Voted Against the S&L Industry</u>	
StGermain	\$144,400	Wylie	\$22,850
Dreier	49,300	McKinney	21,075
Shumway	39,100	Bartlett	20,098
Lehman	37,650	Wortley	16,100
Annunzio	30,920	Frank	15,150
Torres	26,950	Roukema	15,095
Neal	23,300	Parris	12,750
McCollum	19,125	LaFalce	12,300
Oakar	17,700	Ridge	10,000
Hubbard	16,100	Saxton	9,415
Fauntroy	12,685	McCandless	8,100
Vento	12,050	Bunning	6,000
Nelson	12,000	Kleczka	5,700
Manton	11,500	Carper	5,150
Garcia	10,975	Hiler	5,000
Kanjorski	10,750	Roemer	5,000
Erdreich	10,700	McMillan	4,500
Morrison	6,440	Kennedy	4,300
McMillen	5,325	Bereuter	4,150
Schumer	4,850	Roth	3,960
Kaptur	4,300	Swindall	2,400
Price	1,750	Leach	1,080
Patterson	600	Gonzalez	450
Flake	0	Saiki	100
Mfume	0		
Average	\$20,339		\$8,780
Total	\$508,470		\$210,723

Votes vs. Contributions

<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Voted in Favor of S&Ls</u>	<u>Voted Against S&Ls</u>	<u>Percent in Favor of S&Ls</u>
\$0-\$9,999	8	15	35%
\$10-\$24,999	11	9	55%
\$25,000 or more	6	0	100%
Final Vote	25	24	

*Figures taken from a June 1990 Common Cause study, "It's a Wonderful Life." Figures include contributions from 157 PACs and 1,074 individual contributions between 1981 and 1986.

Keating Contributions to the "Keating Five"

<u>Senator</u>	<u>Campaign Contributions</u>	<u>Other Donations</u>
AlanCranston	\$47,000	\$850,000**
JohnGlenn	34,000	200,000***
Dennis DeConcini	55,000	0
Don Riegle	76,100	0
John McCain	<u>112,000</u>	<u>13,433****</u>
Totals	\$324,100	\$1,063,433
Total Contributions		\$1,387,533

****Contributed** to three private organizations involved in registering Democrats to vote and founded or controlled by Senator Cranston

*****Contributed** to the National Council on Public Policy, a political action committee controlled by Glenn.

******Corporate** travel gifts which included three trips to the Bahamas. McCain later reimbursed Keating for these expenses.

THE TOBACCO PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM

Cost to the Taxpayer: As much as \$900 million

Contributions to Congress from 1987 to 1990: \$3 million

One of the most important votes for the tobacco industry in recent years came in 1985, when a proposal was introduced in the House of Representatives to do away with the tobacco price support program. The program has been in place since the early 1930s, when the Agricultural Adjustment Act first designated tobacco as a basic commodity and authorized payments to growers who restricted production. These quotas, which are still in place today, restrain tobacco production, thereby raising the prices that growers receive. The current program uses a combination of price support loans and supply controls.

Defenders of the program contend that it operates at "no net cost" to the taxpayer because of a 1982 provision that requires manufacturers and growers to contribute to a fund to cover any losses should the government need to buy up excess tobacco. But recent figures from the Congressional Research Service and the U.S. Department of Agriculture show that the eventual cost to the taxpayer will be between \$660 million and \$900 million. **That's** because another provision of the program required the government to make up for any losses incurred from flue-cured crops between **1976** and **1981** and a disastrous burley tobacco crop in 1983. In addition, administering the program costs the Agriculture Department \$35.4 million a year.

In 1985, the same year those provisions were adopted, Representative Thomas Petri (**R-WI**) introduced an amendment to the farm bill that would have done away with the tobacco price support program altogether. Petri argued that the system, which required growers to pay for "allotments" from landowners, had become feudalistic and that the "no net cost" provision was bogus because losses were greater than the assessments collected by the government from farmers and manufacturers. Petri's amendment lost, and the support program now in place does not have to be reauthorized, as many other agricultural support programs do.

With pressure on the government from health advocates and the non-smoking public to find ways to discourage smoking — **through** tax increases, bans on advertising, and curbs on smoking in public places — the tobacco industry is fighting an increasingly defensive battle in Congress and in state legislatures. Among the industry's most recent losses was the smoking ban on all domestic airline flights.

But there have also been some victories. Last year, in looking for ways to reduce the federal deficit, Representative Dan **Rostenkowski (D-IL)**, the powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, was among those who promoted a doubling of the **16-cent** tax on a pack of cigarettes. That plan would have raised \$2.8 billion a year. Instead, the final compromise worked out in House-Senate conferences raised the tax only four cents in 1991 and another four cents in 1993. That small increase was considered a victory for the tobacco industry.

The tobacco industry, of course, has long been a large contributor to congressional **campaigns**, donating more than \$3 million to House and Senate campaigns between 1987 and 1990.

**TOBACCO CONTRIBUTIONS (1981-86) AND THE VOTE ON
THE PETRI AMENDMENT**

Amount	Votes Against		Percentage In Favor of Tobacco
	Tobacco	Industry	
\$0	71	25	26%
\$1-\$2,499	90	95	51%
\$2,500-\$4,999	29	66	70%
More than \$5,000	5	44	90%
Final Vote	195	230	
(10 members did not vote)			
Total Contributions	\$242,075	\$677,215	
Average Contribution	\$1,241	\$2,944	

Total Contributions: \$952,540*

*Total includes contributions to members who did not vote

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TAX-WRITING HOUSE AND
SENATE COMMITTEES**

1987-1990

HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE

*ANDREWS	0	JENKINS	12,500
ANTHONY	14,750	JOHNSON (CT)	0
ARCHER	0	*KENNELLY	11,750
*BROWN (CO)	7,250	LEVIN	0
CARDIN	2,200	MATSUI	13,041
CHANDLER	0	*McGRATH	21,000
COYNE	3,500	MOODY	6,100
CRANE	0	PEASE	1,500
*DONNELLY	2,500	PICKLE	2,000
*DORGAN	11,500	*RANGEL	18,000
DOWNEY	7,000	ROSTENKOWSKI	5,500
*FLIPPO	10,750	RUSSO	10,250
FORD (TN)	9,500	SCHULZE	13,750
FRENZEL	5,550	SHAW	5,800
GIBBONS	13,500	*STARK	0
GRADISON	0	*SUNDQUIST	27,250
GUARINI	16,500	THOMAS (CA)	7,000
JACOBS	0	*VANDER JAGT	15,450

*Member, Subcommittee on Revenue Measures

Total Contributions: \$275,391

Average Contribution: \$7,650

Total Contributions to Subcommittee on Revenue Measures: \$125,450

Average Contribution to Subcommittee Members: \$11,405

Contributions to the House Leadership

House Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA)	\$ 16,000
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO)	24,500
Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL)	28,285
Majority Whip William Gray (D-PA)	20,750
Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA)	<u>8,250</u>
Average Contribution	\$19,557
Total Contributions	\$97,785

SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE

PRYOR	9,500	BRADLEY	1,000
*ARMSTRONG	0	MOYNIHAN	1,500
ROTH	3,066	*BOREN	0
*MATSUNAGA	4,000	PACKWOOD	0
*SYMMS	7,000	HEINZ	1,400
DOLE	17,000	CHAFEE	0
MITCHELL	9,000	DASCHLE	9,000
RIEGLE	8,500	BENTSEN	14,000
DURENBERGER	14,266	ROCKEFELLER	8,611
DANFORTH	2,000		
BAUCUS	12,750		

*Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Agricultural Taxation

Average Contribution: \$ 6,130

Total Contributions: \$122,593

Total Contributions to Members of the Subcommittee: \$11,000

Average Contribution to Members of the Subcommittee: \$2,750

Contributions to the Senate Leadership

PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE ROBERT BYRD (D-WV)	\$ 10,000
MAJORITY LEADER GEORGE MITCHELL (D-ME)	9,000
MINORITY LEADER ROBERT DOLE (R-KS)	17,000
MAJORITY WHIP ALAN CRANSTON (D-CA)	-0-
MINORITY WHIP ALAN SIMPSON (R-WY)	<u>9,000</u>

Average Contribution \$9,000

Total Contributions \$45,000

**TOTAL TOBACCO CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE,
1987-1990: \$3,010,903**

AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION, 1987-1990: \$5,628

APPENDIX I

HOUSE SUGAR VOTE AND 1985-90 CONTRIBUTIONS FROM 17 SUGAR PACS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
Voted Against Sugar Industry:		GOODLING	-0-	NIELSON	\$500
		GORDON	\$6,100	NOWAK	-0-
		GRADISON	\$700	OAKAR	\$4,600
ANNUNZIO	-0-	GREEN	\$300	OWENS (UT)	\$10,150
ARCHER	-0-	GUARINI	-0-	OWENS (NY)	\$2,100
ARMEY	\$500	HALL (OH)	\$500	PACKARD	-0-
ATKINS	-0-	HAMILTON	\$3,000	PALLONE	-0-
BARNARD	\$1,500	HAMMERSCHMIDT	\$3,500	PAYNE (NJ)	-0-
BARTLETT	-0-	HANCOCK	\$900	PEASE	-0-
BATES	\$250	HAWKINS	\$1,700	PETRI	\$250
BEILENSON	-0-	HENRY	\$3,500	PORTER	-0-
BENNETT	\$500	HILER	\$2,250	RANGEL	\$2,550
BERMAN	\$1,350	HOCHBRUECKNER	\$500	REGULA	-0-
BORSKI	-0-	HOUGHTON	\$500	RHODES	\$2,600
BOUCHER	\$12,500	HUGHES	-0-	RINALDO	\$2,400
BRENNAN	\$300	HYDE	-0-	RITTER	\$250
BROOMFIELD	\$1,250	JACOBS	-0-	ROHRABACHER	\$250
BURTON	\$250	JOHNSON (CT)	\$750	ROSTENKOWSKI	\$5,000
CAMPBELL (CA)	\$1,150	KANJORSKI	\$500	ROUKEMA	\$300
CARPER	-0-	KENNEDY	\$300	ROWLAND (CT)	\$1,150
CHANDLER	\$4,550	KENNELLY	\$500	SAVAGE	\$3,100
CLAY	-0-	KOLBE	\$750	SAWYER	\$650
CONTE	-0-	KOSTMAYER	\$1,000	SAXTON	-0-
CONYERS	\$300	KYL	\$1,950	SCHEUER	-0-
COOPER	\$750	LAFALCE	-0-	SCHNEIDER	\$1,500
COURTER	-0-	LEACH	-0-	SCHROEDER	\$500
COX	\$550	LEHMAN (FL)	\$2,800	SCHULZE	\$300
COYNE	-0-	LENT	-0-	SCHUMER	-0-
CRANE	\$250	LEVINE	-0-	SENSENBRENNER	-0-
DELAY	\$1,400	LEWIS (GA)	\$2,000	SERRANO	\$1,300
DEWINE	\$1,750	LLOYD	\$7,850	SHARP	-0-
DIXON	\$2,150	LUKENS	\$300	SHAW	\$2,800
DONNELLY	-0-	MACHTLEY	\$1,100	SHAYS	-0-
DOUGLAS	-0-	MARKEY	-0-	SLATTERY	\$6,400
DOWNEY	\$1,850	MARTIN (IL)	\$7,300	SMITH (NJ)	-0-
DWYER	-0-	MAZZOLI	\$250	SMITH (NH)	\$550
EARLY	-0-	MCCURDY	\$6,500	SNOWE	-0-
ECKART	\$250	MCDADE	-0-	SOLOMON	-0-
EDWARDS (CA)	\$6,400	MCDERMOTT	\$2,550	SPRATT	\$4,600
EDWARDS (OK)	\$4,550	MCGRATH	\$1,000	STUDDS	-0-
FAWELL	-0-	MCHUGH	-0-	SUNDQUIST	\$1,200
FEIGHAN	-0-	MCNULTY	\$1,600	UDALL	-0-
FIELDS	-0-	MEYERS	\$2,050	UPTON	-0-
FRANK	-0-	MILLER (OH)	-0-	VISCLOSKEY	\$290
FRENZEL	\$8,850	MILLER (WA)	\$1,000	WALGREN	\$10,150
GALLO	\$1,700	MOAKLEY	\$200	WALKER	-0-
GEJDENSON	-0-	MOODY	\$3,500	WASHINGTON	\$1,400
GEKAS	-0-	MRAZEK	\$550	WAXMAN	\$500
GIBBONS	\$11,850	NEAL (MA)	-0-	WEISS	-0-

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
WELDON	\$1,650	COBLE	\$8,750	GUNDERSON	\$15,150
WOLF	-0-	COLEMAN (TX)	\$10,300	HALL (TX)	\$3,950
WYLIE	\$1,300	COLEMAN (MO)	\$12,550	HARRIS	\$10,100
YATES	-0-	COLLINS	\$4,300	HASTERT	\$1,550
YATRON	-0-	COMBEST	\$11,400	HATCHER	\$17,200
YOUNG (FL)	<u>\$250</u>	CONDIT	\$6,520	HAYES (IL)	\$300
		COSTELLO	\$4,200	HAYES (LA)	\$3,900
Total	\$206,990	CRAIG	\$6,350	HEFLEY	\$5,950
		DANNEMEYER	\$4,400	HEFNER	\$10,950
Voted in Favor of Sugar Industry:		DARDEN	\$8,050	HERGER	\$18,175
		DAVIS	\$13,400	HERTEL	\$4,250
ACKERMAN	\$500	DELAGARZA	\$28,750	HOAGLAND	\$4,300
ALEXANDER	\$35,350	DEFAZIO	\$2,300	HOLLOWAY	\$14,300
ANDERSON	\$3,450	DELLUMS	\$250	HOPKINS	\$9,750
ANDREWS	-0-	DERRICK	\$17,900	HORTON	\$4,250
ANTHONY	\$7,000	DICKINSON	\$4,100	HOYER	\$5,550
APPLEGATE	\$2,350	DICKS	\$6,000	HUBBARD	\$12,925
ASPIN	\$3,000	DINGELL	\$6,200	HUCKABY	\$35,800
AUCOIN	\$6,600	DORGAN	\$44,600	HUNTER	\$6,700
BAKER	\$3,700	DORNAN	\$5,950	HUTTO	\$1,000
BALLENGER	\$4,700	DREIER	\$1,350	INHOFE	\$7,300
BARTON	\$10,300	DUNCAN	\$5,300	IRELAND	\$8,500
BATEMAN	\$8,350	DURBIN	\$36,157	JAMES	\$3,650
BENTLEY	\$500	DYMALLY	\$4,650	JENKINS	\$4,100
BEREUTER	\$8,600	DYSON	\$16,700	JOHNSON (SD)	\$19,700
BEVILL	\$3,800	EMERSON	\$28,800	JOHNSTON	\$6,200
BILBRAY	\$4,500	ENGEL	\$4,000	JONES (GA)	\$3,900
BLILEY	\$11,600	ENGLISH	\$18,750	JONES (NC)	\$5,500
BOEHLERT	\$500	ERDREICH	\$9,300	JONTZ	\$21,600
BOGGS	\$5,300	ESPY	\$18,750	KAPTUR	\$6,850
BONTOR	\$35,091	EVANS	\$20,900	KASICH	\$250
BOSCO	\$4,600	FASCELL	\$6,600	KASTENMEIER	\$3,000
BOXER	\$8,360	FAZIO	\$14,010	KILDEE	\$6,650
BROOKS	\$4,850	FISH	-0-	KLECZKA	\$4,950
BROWDER	\$4,550	FLAKE	\$2,250	KOLTER	\$12,150
BROWN (CA)	\$18,600	FLIPPO	\$5,850	LAGOMARSINO	\$6,740
BROWN (CO)	\$2,750	FOGLIETTA	\$5,550	LANCASTER	\$10,200
BRUCE	\$11,300	FORD (MI)	\$7,600	LANTOS	\$2,050
BRYANT	\$10,800	FROST	\$8,200	LAUGHLIN	\$2,850
BUECHNER	\$4,175	GALLEGLY	\$4,600	LEATH	\$300
BUNNING	\$6,850	GAYDOS	\$7,900	LEHMAN (CA)	\$6,550
BUSTAMANTE	\$8,350	GEPHARDT	\$9,300	LEVIN	\$7,000
BYRON	-0-	GEREN	\$2,750	LEWIS (CA)	\$8,000
CALLAHAN	\$2,150	GILLMOR	\$15,280	LEWIS (FL)	\$15,300
CAMPBELL (CO)	\$12,050	GILMAN	\$11,350	LIGHTFOOT	\$7,500
CARDIN	\$1,200	GINGRICH	\$11,400	LIPINSKI	\$1,500
CARR	\$6,850	GLICKMAN	\$17,750	LIVINGSTON	\$2,600
CHAPMAN	\$7,750	GONZALEZ	\$300	LONG	\$13,800
CLARKE	\$1,550	GOSS	\$3,850	LOWERY	\$6,950
CLEMENT	\$6,050	GRANDY	\$17,590	LUKEN	\$500
CLINGER	\$11,650	GRANT	\$7,900	MADIGAN	\$27,250
		GRAY	\$19,000	MANTON	\$11,850

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
MARLENEE	\$23,050	ROBERTS	\$14,500	TORRICELLI	\$250
MARTIN (NY)	\$3,750	ROBINSON	\$3,500	TOWNS	\$7,650
MARTINEZ	\$850	ROE	\$4,750	TRAFICANT	-0-
MATSUI	\$12,150	ROGERS	\$4,750	TRAXLER	\$22,215
MAVROULES	\$3,900	ROS-LEHTINEN	\$2,750	UNSOELD	\$2,750
MCCANDLESS	\$5,900	ROSE	\$23,300	VALENTINE	\$8,950
MCCLOSKEY	\$10,650	ROTH	\$5,900	VANDER JAGT	\$9,850
MCCOLLUM	\$3,900	ROWLAND (GA)	\$5,550	VENTO	\$15,400
MCCRERY	\$5,350	ROYBAL	\$2,000	VOLKMER	\$12,950
MCEWEN	\$3,300	RUSSO	\$11,550	VUCANOVICH	\$3,550
MCMILLAN	\$10,850	SABO	\$19,850	WALSH	\$4,900
MCMILLEN	\$4,200	SAIKI	\$4,900	WEBER	\$28,950
MFUME	\$500	SANGMEISTER	\$4,100	WHEAT	\$8,650
MICHEL	\$26,000	SARPALIUS	\$16,780	WHITTAKER	\$6,202
MILLER (CA)	\$6,650	SCHAEFER	\$6,550	WHITTEN	\$13,000
MINETA	\$6,000	SCHIFF	\$2,600	WILLIAMS	\$8,050
MOLINARI	-0-	SCHUETTE	\$31,102	WILSON	\$2,650
MOLLOHAN	\$8,100	SHUMWAY	\$4,640	WISE	\$5,700
MONTGOMERY	\$3,550	SHUSTER	\$5,500	WOLPE	\$9,700
MOORHEAD	\$6,850	SIKORSKI	\$22,600	WYDEN	\$5,350
MORRISON (WA)	\$2,800	SKAGGS	\$6,350	YOUNG (AK)	\$15,900
MURPHY	\$4,400	SKEEN	\$12,500		
MURTHA	\$5,750	SKELTON	\$12,900	Total	\$2,387,188
MYERS	\$7,450	SLAUGHTER (VA)	\$2,900		
NAGLE	\$12,965	SLAUGHTER (NY)	\$5,100	<u>Not Voting</u>	
NATCHER	-0-	SMITH, D. (OR)	\$14,750		
NEAL (NC)	\$14,300	SMITH (TX)	\$4,300	BILIRAKIS	\$2,950
OBERSTAR	\$13,650	SMITH (FL)	\$5,700	COUGHLIN	-0-
OBEY	\$9,900	SMITH (IA)	\$6,350	CROCKETT	\$2,000
OLIN	\$16,300	SMITH (VT)	\$6,350	FOLEY	\$30,750
ORTIZ	\$3,800	SMITH, R. (OR)	\$12,200	FORD (TN)	\$1,000
OXLEY	\$3,600	SMITH (NE)	\$9,150	HANSEN	\$5,900
PANETTA	\$8,400	SOLARZ	-0-	LOWEY	\$500
PARKER	\$6,700	SPENCE	\$6,300	MORELLA	\$1,500
PARRIS	\$2,000	STAGGERS	\$10,100	MORRISON (CT)	-0-
PASHAYAN	\$9,550	STALLINGS	\$35,000	NELSON	\$4,050
PATTERSON	\$8,700	STANGELAND	\$86,261	SISISKY	\$2,350
PAXON	\$2,550	STARK	\$6,600	WATKINS	\$4,600
PAYNE (VA)	\$7,150	STEARNS	\$2,050		
PELOSI	\$4,550	STENHOLM	\$7,450	Total	\$55,600
PENNY	\$18,600	STOKES	\$10,400		
PERKINS	\$11,900	STUMP	\$7,400		
PICKETT	\$5,100	SWIFT	\$6,350		
PICKLE	\$2,800	SYNAR	\$350		
POSHARD	-0-	TALLON	\$16,650	Total Contributions	\$2,649,778
PRICE	\$6,650	TANNER	\$2,950		
PURSELL	\$9,700	TAUKE	\$4,100		
QUILLEN	\$21,250	TAUZIN	\$6,850		
RAHALL	\$7,100	TAYLOR	\$500		
RAVENEL	\$1,950	THOMAS (WY)	\$5,500		
RAY	\$3,400	THOMAS (GA)	\$12,850		
RICHARDSON	\$5,200	THOMAS (CA)	\$15,200		
RIDGE	\$1,050	TORRES	\$400		

SENATE SUGAR VOTE AND SUGAR PAC CONTRIBUTIONS, 1985-1990

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
Voted In Favor Of Sugar Industry:		WALLOP	\$16,708	Not Voting:	
		WILSON	\$27,126		
		WIRTH	<u>\$5,250</u>	GARN	\$4,500
ADAMS	\$15,500	Total	\$994,467	PRESSLER	<u>\$24,500</u>
AKAKA	\$10,750	Voted Against Sugar Industry		Total	\$29,000
BAUCUS	\$19,250	ARMSTRONG	-0-	Total	
BENTSEN	\$23,300	BIDEN	-0-	Contributions:	\$1,303,348
BOREN	\$2,000	BINGAMAN	\$20,500	17 SUGAR PACS/SPONSORS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY:	
BOSCHWITZ	\$34,625	BOND	\$12,250	1. Amalgamated Sugar Company PAC	
BREAUX	\$10,750	BRADLEY	\$0	2. American Crystal Sugar PAC	
BUMPERS	\$4,750	BRYAN	\$2,000	3. American Sugar Cane League PAC	
BURDICK	\$29,504	CHAFEE	-0-	4. American Sugarbeet Growers Association PAC	
BURNS	\$11,500	COATS	\$11,000	5. Archer Daniels Midland Co. PAC	
BYRD	\$11,000	COHEN	\$2,000	6. California Beet Growers Association	
COCHRAN	\$18,500	DANFORTH	\$3,250	7. Florida Sugar Cane League PAC	
CONRAD	\$35,315	DOLE	\$53,000	8. Great Lakes Sugar Beet Growers	
CRANSTON	\$14,700	DOMENICI	\$2,500	9. Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association PAC	
D'AMATO	\$5,500	GLENN	\$4,750	10. Michigan Sugar Co. PAC	
DASCHLE	\$26,135	GORTON	\$4,000	11. Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative PAC	
DECONCINI	\$17,250	GRASSLEY	\$20,900	12. Political Action Committee of the Texas Sugar Beet Growers Association, Inc.	
DIXON	\$36,800	HATFIELD	\$6,500	13. Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers PAC	
DODD	\$4,000	HEINZ	\$2,000	14. Savannah Foods & Industries Inc. PAC	
DURENBERGER	\$42,601	HUMPHREY	-0-	15. Southern Minnesota Sugar Cooperative	
EXON	\$37,752	JEFFORDS	\$10,800	16. Staley Political Action Committee	
FORD	\$8,000	KASSEBAUM	\$500	17. United States Beet Sugar Association PAC	
FOWLER	\$23,500	KASTEN	\$1,000		
GORE	\$18,500	KENNEDY	-0-		
GRAHAM	\$19,500	KERRY	\$1,500		
GRAMM	\$26,806	KOHL	-0-		
HARKIN	\$44,250	LAUTENBERG	\$1,000		
HATCH	\$19,296	LIEBERMAN	\$3,000		
HEFLIN	\$24,750	LUGAR	\$19,500		
HELMS	\$41,150	MCCAIN	\$6,500		
HOLLINGS	\$15,150	MCCONNELL	\$19,431		
INOUE	\$7,250	METZENBAUM	\$2,000		
JOHNSTON	\$23,150	MITCHELL	\$15,000		
KERREY	\$6,000	MOYNIHAN	-0-		
LEAHY	\$11,250	MURKOWSKI	\$9,750		
LEVIN	\$22,550	NICKLES	-0-		
LOTT	\$6,500	NUNN	\$10,000		
MACK	\$12,850	PACKWOOD	\$3,000		
MCCLURE	\$8,033	PELL	\$1,000		
MIKULSKI	\$500	REID	\$7,000		
PRYOR	\$14,000	ROBB	\$10,000		
RIEGLE	\$14,943	ROTH	-0-		
ROCKEFELLER	\$20,000	RUDMAN	-0-		
SANFORD	\$14,250	SARBANES	-0-		
SASSER	\$19,500	SPECTER	\$3,000		
SHELBY	\$9,250	WARNER	<u>\$11,250</u>		
SIMON	\$49,373	Total	\$279,881		
SIMPSON	\$15,000				
STEVENS	\$10,250				
SYMMS	\$19,850				
THURMOND	\$8,500				

APPENDIX II

SENATE VOTE AND AUTO PAC CONTRIBUTIONS FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS

SENATOR	9/14/90 VOTE	9/25/90 VOTE	CONTRIBUTIONS (1985 - 1990)	SENATOR	9/14/90 VOTE	9/25/90 VOTE	CONTRIBUTIONS (1985-1990)
ADAMS	Y	Y	\$7,500	HATFIELD	Y	Y	17,500
AKAKA	Y	Y	6,000	HEFLIN	N	N	22,000
ARMSTRONG	N	N	-0-	HEINZ	Y	Y	7,500
BAUCUS	Y	Y	8,500	HELMS	N	N	24,250
BENTSEN	Y	Y	39,700	HOLLINGS	Y	Y	30,750
BIDEN	Y	Y	5,625	HUMPHREY	Y	N	1,000
BINGAMAN	Y	Y	20,000	INOUE	Y	Y	24,750
BOND	N	N	51,750	JEFFORDS	Y	Y	14,000
BOREN	N	N	-0-	JOHNSTON	NV	N	22,250
BOSCHWITZ	Y	Y	29,000	KASSEBAUM	Y	N	3,000
BRADLEY	Y	Y	24,000	KASTEN	N	N	42,720
BREAUX	N	N	12,500	KENNEDY	Y	Y	4,500
BRYAN	Y	Y	7,250	KERREY	Y	Y	10,200
BUMPERS	Y	Y	19,800	KERRY	Y	Y	-0-
BURDICK	Y	Y	18,750	KOHL	Y	Y	-0-
BURNS	N	N	22,000	LAUTENBERG	Y	Y	25,150
BYRD	N	N	22,000	LEAHY	Y	Y	8,500
CHAFEE	Y	Y	19,400	LEVIN	N	N	20,550
COATS	N	N	47,400	LIEBERMAN	Y	Y	-0-
COCHRAN	N	N	12,500	LOTT	N	N	18,000
COHEN	Y	Y	8,000	LUGAR	N	N	29,375
CONRAD	Y	Y	9,000	MACK	N	N	40,400
CRANSTON	Y	Y	15,400	MCCAIN -	Y	Y	19,335
D'AMATO	Y	Y	21,725	MCCLURE	N	N	4,600
DANFORTH	Y	Y	37,150	MCCONNELL	N	N	30,500
DASCHLE	Y	Y	22,500	METZENBAUM	Y	Y	6,000
DECONCINI	Y	Y	10,800	MIKULSKI	Y	Y	4,300
DIXON	N	N	28,800	MITCHELL	Y	Y	5,500
DODD	Y	Y	8,200	MOYNIHAN	Y	Y	5,750
DOLE	N	N	51,620	MURKOWSKI	Y	N	17,000
DOMENICI	Y	N	31,500	NICKLES	N	N	31,650
DURENBERGER	Y	Y	34,000	NUNN	Y	N	15,500
EXON	Y	Y	29,500	PACKWOOD	Y	Y	22,250
FORD	N	N	30,000	PELL	Y	Y	11,500
FOWLER	Y	Y	8,500	PRESSLER	Y	Y	16,000
GARN	NV	N	19,500	PRYOR	Y	Y	8,000
GLENN	Y	N	22,400	REID	Y	Y	6,000
GORE	Y	Y	17,250	RIEGLE	N	N	39,350
GORTON	Y	Y	53,350	ROBB	Y	Y	12,800
GRAHAM	Y	Y	8,000	ROCKEFELLER	Y	Y	14,500
GRAMM	N	N	26,750	ROTH	Y	Y	35,250
GRASSLEY	Y	N	27,500	RUDMAN	Y	Y	-0-
HARKIN	Y	Y	13,105	SANFORD	Y	Y	8,950
HATCH	N	N	27,500	SARBANES	Y	Y	7,800

SENATOR	9/14/90 VOTE	9/25/90 VOTE	CONTRIBUTIONS (1985 - 1990)
SASSER	Y	N	30,500
SHELBY	N	N	14,000
SIMON	Y	Y	19,500
SIMPSON	NV	N	23,000
SPECTER	Y	N	31,000
STEVENS	Y	N	18,000
SYMMS	N	N	38,000
THURMOND	N	N	15,500
WALLOP	N	N	26,700
WARNER	Y -	N	19,500
WILSON	A	A	41,100
WIRTH	Y	Y	<u>15,700</u>
TOTAL			1,917,155

**27 AUTO INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS AND COMPANY PACS
INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY:**

1. American Motors Corp.
2. **A.O.** Smith Corporation
3. Arvin Industries Inc.
4. Auto Dealers and Drivers for Free Trade
5. Automotive Warehouse Distributors Association
6. B.F. Goodrich
7. Budd Company
8. Chrysler Corp.
9. General Motors Civic Involvement
10. Dana Corporation
11. National Automobile Dealers **Association**
12. Eaton Corporation
13. Mogul Corporation
14. **Fleetwood** Enterprises, Inc.
15. Ford Motor Co.
16. **Freuhaf** Corp.
17. General Automotive Corp.
18. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
19. **I.C.** Industries **Inc.**
20. Maremont Corp.
21. Tire Dealers & **Retreaders** Association
22. New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.
23. **PHH** Group Inc.
24. Ryder System Inc.
25. Sealed Power Corporation
26. **Ingersoll-Rand** Co.
27. **Warshawsky & Co./J.C.** Whitney & Co.

APPENDIX III

TOBACCO INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS -- HOUSE, 1981-1985

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
Voted in Favor of Tobacco Industry		DORGAN (ND)	3,000	KASTENMEIER	1,000
		DOWDY	10,400	KENNELLY	2,875
		DUNCAN	9,500	KINDNESS	3,200
AKAKA	-0-	DYMALLY	2,400	KLECZKA	250
ALEXANDER	4,000	DYSON	3,410	KOLTER	500
ANDREWS	3,250	EMERSON	5,450	LATTA	1,750
ANTHONY	5,550	ENGLISH	4,450	LEATH	500
ASPIN	2,700	EVANS (IA)	2,250	LEHMAN (CA)	300
BARNARD	700	FASCELL	5,000	LELAND	3,375
BATEMAN	4,250	FAZIO	3,400	LENT	4,950
BEDELL	-0-	FLIPPO	8,000	LEVIN (MI)	-0-
BENNETT	-0-	FOLEY	7,000	LEWIS (FL)	500
BENTLEY	2,500	FORD (MI)	500	LIPINSKI	200
BEVILL	2,050	FOWLER	7,600	LLOYD	3,100
BLAGGI	500	FRANKLIN	2,250	LOEFFLER	1,500
BILIRAKIS	1,500	FROST	1,250	LONG	4,000
BLILEY	14,800	FUQUA	4,350	LOTT	7,950
BOGGS	2,550	GALLO	2,250	LOWRY (WA)	-0-
BONER	4,700	GAYDOS	1,000	LUJAN	3,450
BONIOR	1,300	GEPHARDT	1,000	MADIGAN	5,875
BORSKI	-0-	GINGRICH	1,000	MANTON	1,750
BOSCO	1,000	GLICKMAN	-0-	MARLENEE	2,050
BOUCHER	4,000	GONZALEZ	500	MARTIN (NY)	3,105
BROOKS	3,800	GORDON	3,250	MARTINEZ	500
BROYHILL	3,500	GRADISON	-0-	MATSUI	2,750
BRUCE	1,750	GRAY (IL)	1,000	MAZZOLI	4,550
BURTON (CA)	-0-	GRAY (PA)	3,000	MCCAIN	3,250
BUSTAMANTE	1,000	GROTBORG	2,250	MCCLOSKEY	1,000
BYRON	600	GUNDERSON	3,050	MCCURDY	1,000
CAMPBELL	9,150	HALL, R.	3,750	MCEWEN	2,000
CARNEY	1,200	HAMILTON	4,075	MCGRATH	4,600
CARR	1,750	HAMMERSCHMIDT	300	MCMILLAN (NC)	5,950
CHAPMAN	500	HARTNETT	1,750	MICA	2,300
CHAPPELL	3,300	HATCHER	5,750	MIKULSKI	1,000
CHAPPIE	1,200	HAWKINS, A.	150	MILLER (OH)	2,200
CLAY	1,500	HAYES	-0-	MITCHELL	-0-
COBEY	2,500	HEFNER	9,500	MOLLOHAN	2,500
COBLE	3,750	HEFTEL	250	MONTGOMERY	-0-
COELHO	12,750	HENDON	4,950	MOORE	5,150
COLEMAN (MO)	2,132	HOLT	2,075	MURPHY	800
COLEMAN (TX)	750	HOPKINS	11,650	MURTHA	2,400
COMBEST	2,500	HORTON	750	MYERS (IN)	500
COOPER	1,500	HOWARD	6,350	NATCHER	-0-
DANIEL	4,500	HOYER	1,350	NEAL (NC)	10,800
DARDEN	2,250	HUBBARD	6,050	NICHOLS	750
DASCHLE	3,250	HUCKABY	2,250	OAKAR	-0-
DE LA GARZA	5,200	HUTTO	-0-	OBEY	1,700
DERRICK	4,550	JEFFORDS	-0-	O'BRIEN	2,250
DICKINSON	1,250	JENKINS	4,000	OLIN	4,750
DICKS	1,150	JONES (OK)	13,275	ORTIZ	2,500
DINGELL	5,000	JONES (NC)	8,000	OXLEY	4,350
DIXON, J.	3,550	JONES (TN)	5,000	PANETTA	1,750

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
PARRIS	2,850	TORRES	2,301	BRYANT	3,100
PASHAYAN	150	TOWNS	3,500	CALLAHAN	1,250
PENNY	1,750	TRAFICANT	1,000	CARPER	-0-
PEPPER	500	TRAXLER	-0-	CHANDLER	1,250
PERKINS	1,250	UDALL	1,000	CHENEY	4,000
PICKLE	-0-	VALENTINE	9,250	CLINGER	2,650
PRICE	-0-	VANDER JAGT	6,950	COATS	3,400
QUILLEN	6,750	VOLKMER	2,600	COLLINS	-0-
RAHALL	1,650	WALKER	2,850	CONTE	1,250
RANGEL	6,125	WATKINS	1,450	CONYERS	-0-
RAY	6,200	WEAVER	-0-	COUGHLIN	2,500
RICHARDSON	6,750	WEBER	300	COURTER	250
ROBERTS	1,950	WHEAT	2,300	COYNE	100
ROBINSON	2,200	WHITLEY	6,050	CRAIG	250
ROE	250	WHITTEN	3,000	CRANE	750
ROGERS	8,200	WILLIAMS	-0-	CROCKETT	-0-
ROSE	9,425	WILSON	-0-	DANNEMEYER	4,450
ROSTENKOWSKI	7,550	WISE	500	DAUB	2,000
ROTH	4,342	WOLF	2,350	DAVIS	-0-
ROWLAND (GA)	4,900	WORTLEY	1,250	DELAY	1,500
ROYBAL	500	WRIGHT	13,000	DELLUMS	-0-
RUDD	1,000	YATRON	600	DEWINE	2,500
RUSSO	5,300	YOUNG (AK)	1,000	DIOGUARDI	12,000
SABO	500	YOUNG (MO)	1,500	DONNELLY	1,000
SCHUETTE	1,500			DORNAN (CA)	1,500
SCHULZE	6,050			DOWNEY	1,800
SHELBY	6,925	Voted Against Tobacco		DREIER	750
SIKORSKY	9,400	Industry		DURBIN	1,750
SISISKY	4,250			DWYER	700
SKEEN	1,750	ANDERSON	-0-	EARLY	1,200
SKELTON	2,250	ANNUNZIO	250	ECKART (OH)	500
SLAUGHTER	4,000	APPLEGATE	250	ECKERT (NY)	2,500
SMITH (IA)	-0-	ARCHER	-0-	EDGER	1,000
SMITH (NE)	-0-	ARMEY	1,000	EDWARDS (OK)	-0-
SMITH R. (OR)	5,750	ATKINS	-0-	EDWARDS (CA)	-0-
SNYDER	5,150	AUCOIN	1,400	ERDREICH	1,250
SPENCE	1,650	BADHAM	1,000	EVANS (IL)	500
SPRATT	3,650	BARNES	-0-	FAWELL	1,750
STAGGERS	4,000	BARTLETT	3,200	FEIGHAN	250
STANGELAND	2,750	BARTON	1,000	FIEDLER	-0-
STENHOLM	3,450	BATES	1,800	FIELDS	2,600
STOKES	950	BEILENSEN	-0-	FISH	500
STRANG	1,000	BEREUTER	250	FLORIO	4,800
STUMP	1,150	BERMAN	-0-	FOGLIETTA	-0-
SUNDQUIST	3,600	BOEHLERT	-0-	FORD (TN)	8,300
SWIFT	3,500	BOLAND	-0-	FRANK	-0-
SWINDALL	2,500	BONKER	-0-	FRENZEL	4,750
SYNAR	-0-	BOULTER	1,000	GARCIA	3,500
TALLON	4,800	BOXER	1,250	GEJDENSEN	-0-
TAUZIN	4,540	BREAUX	-0-	GEKAS	500
TAYLOR	4,200	BROOMFIELD	-0-	GIBBONS	4,500
THOMAS (CA)	2,500	BROWN (CA)	-0-	GILMAN	3,250
THOMAS (GA)	6,150	BROWN (CO)	1,500	GOODLING	250

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
GREEN	2,250	MORRISON (CT)	1,750	VENTO	-0-
GREGG	500	MORRISON (WA)	1,500	VISCLOSKY	1,000
GUARINI	4,750	MRAZEK	-0-	VUCANOVICH	1,100
HALL (OH)	1,000	NELSON	50	WALGREN	2,600
HANSEN	300	NIELSON	1,250	WAXMAN	-0-
HENRY	1,000	NOWAK	-0-	WEISS	-0-
HERTEL	-0-	OWENS	1,000	WHITEHURST	1,000
HILER	250	PACKARD	-0-	WHITTAKER	750
HILLIS	1,100	PEASE	2,300	WIRTH	3,100
HUGHES	250	PETRI	-0-	WOLPE	-0-
HUNTER	-0-	PORTER	700	WYDEN	-0-
HYDE	1,000	PURSELL	-0-	WYLIE	-0-
IRELAND	550	REGULA	-0-	YATES	-0-
JACOBS	-0-	REID	3,000	YOUNG (FL)	-0-
JOHNSON, N.	2,450	RIDGE	1,000	ZSCHAU	-0-
KANJORSKI	250	RINALDO	7,050		
KAPTUR	-0-	RITTER	500	Not Voting	
KASICH	2,000	RODINO	2,000		
KOLBE	2,000	ROEMER	150	ACKERMAN	-0-
KOSTMAYER	3,650	ROUKEMA	-0-	ADDABBO	2,150
KRAMER	1,250	ROWLAND (CT)	1,500	BURTON	2,500
LAFALCE	-0-	SAVAGE	-0-	KEMP	13,600
LAGOMARSINO	1,000	SAXTON	2,250	KILDEE	-0-
LANTOS	-0-	SCHAEFER	3,000	LEWIS (CA)	250
LEACH	-0-	SCHEUER	-0-	MCCANDLESS	2,500
LEHMAN (FL)	-0-	SCHNEIDER	-0-	MCKINNEY	7,250
LEVINE (CA)	-0-	SCHROEDER	-0-	O'NEILL	5,000
LIGHTFOOT	-0-	SCHUMER	-0-	OBERSTAR	-0-
LIVINGSTON	250	SEIBERLING	-0-		
LOWERY (CA)	250	SENSENBRENNER	1,000		
LUKEN	5,500	SHARP	3,000	TOBACCO PACS INCLUDED	
LUNDINE	250	SHAW	250	IN THIS STUDY:	
LUNGREN	-0-	SHUMER	-0-		
MACK	4,300	SHUMWAY	-0-	Batus Inc.	
MACKAY	-0-	SHUSTER	2,000	Brown & Williams Tobacco Corp.	
MARKEY	-0-	SILJANDER	500	Cigar Association of America	
MARTIN (IL)	4,400	SLATTERY	3,750	National Association of Tobacco	
MAVROULES	-0-	SMITH (NJ)	-0-	Distributors	
MCCOLLUM	750	SMITH, D.(OR)	1,250	Philip Morris Inc.	
MCDADE	2,550	SMITH, R.(NH)	2,550	RJR Nabisco Inc.	
MCHUGH	-0-	SMITH (FL)	2,500	Smokeless Tobacco Council Inc.	
MCKERNAN	-0-	SNOWE	-0-	Tobacco Institute Inc.	
MEYERS	550	SOLARZ	750	United States Tobacco Company	
MICHEL	18,325	SOLOMON	1,850		
MILLER (CA)	-0-	ST GERMAIN	-0-		
MILLER (WA)	750	STALLINGS	2,000		
MINETA	250	STARK	1,250		
MOAKLEY	-0-	STRATTON	-0-		
MOLINARI	2,000	STUDDS	-0-		
MONSON	-0-	SWEENEY	1,000		
MOODY	3,700	TAUKE	1,750		
MOORHEAD	2,000	TORRICELLI	250		

APPENDIX IV

NRA CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE UNSOELD AMENDMENT

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
Voted In Favor of NRA		DEFAZIO	\$12,900	HUCKABY	\$300
Position:		DELAY	\$4,650	HUNTER	\$6,850
ALEXANDER	\$15,850	DERRICK	\$19,800	HUTTO	\$500
ANDREWS	\$0	DICKINSON	\$19,800	HYDE	\$0
ANTHONY	\$0	DINGELL	\$8,950	INHOFE	\$18,800
APPLEGATE	\$0	DORGAN	\$1,000	IRELAND	\$800
ARCHER	\$0	DORNAN	\$9,900	JACOBS	\$0
ARMEY	\$12,900	DOUGLAS	\$4,950	JAMES	\$300
ASPIN	\$0	DREIER	-0-	JENKINS	\$0
BAKER	\$4,750	DUNCAN	\$3,400	JOHNSON (SD)	\$6,250
BALLENGER	\$550	DYSON	\$17,400	JONES (NC)	\$0
BARNARD	\$0	ECKART	-0-	JONTZ	\$7,800
BARTLETT	\$4,000	EMERSON	\$18,850	KANJORSKI	\$24,800
BARTON	\$7,800	ENGLISH	\$0	KASICH	\$7,350
BENTLEY	\$4,250	ERDREICH	\$1,350	KOLBE	\$5,450
BEREUTER	\$0	ESPY	\$14,850	KOLTER	\$9,700
BEVILL	\$0	FIELDS	\$7,500	KOSTMAYER	\$0
BILBRAY	\$4,950	FISH	\$8,950	KYL	\$5,250
BILIRAKIS	\$0	FLIPPO	\$0	LAGOMARSINO	\$0
BLILEY	\$6,350	FORD (MI)	\$600	LANCASTER	\$6,550
BOEHLERT	\$1,250	FRENZEL	\$0	LAUGHLIN	\$1,200
BOGGS	\$0	FROST	\$0	LEATH	\$5,200
BOUCHER	\$19,800	GALLEGLY	\$11,200	LENT	\$0
BROOKS	\$14,850	GALLO	\$5,500	LEWIS (CA)	\$5,450
BROWDER	\$300	GAYDOS	\$0	LEWIS (FL)	\$500
BROWN (CO)	\$0	GEKAS	\$600	LIGHTFOOT	\$8,650
BRUCE	\$7,750	GEREN	\$9,900	LIVINGSTON	\$300
BUECHNER	\$8,950	GILLMOR	\$5,250	LLOYD	\$11,950
BUNNING	\$6,250	GILMAN	\$375	LONG	\$0
BURTON	\$17,050	GINGRICH	\$6,000	LOWERY (CA)	\$1,250
BUSTAMANTE	\$1,100	GOODLING	\$0	LUKENS	\$6,500
BYRON	\$0	GORDON	\$3,000	MADIGAN	\$1,000
CALLAHAN	\$2,550	GRANDY	\$8,500	MARLENEE	\$19,852
CAMPBELL (CO)	\$1,050	GRANT	\$16,850	MARTIN (NY)	\$0
CARR	\$10,039	GUNDERSON	\$0	MARTIN (IL)	\$0
CHAPMAN	\$10,700	HALL (TX)	\$300	MARTINEZ	\$0
CLARKE	\$0	HALL (OH)	\$0	MCCANDLESS	\$1,300
CLEMENT	\$0	HAMILTON	\$500	MCCOLLUM	\$0
CLINGER	\$11,275	HAMMERSCHMIDT	\$0	MCCRERY	\$5,450
COBLE	\$9,000	HANCOCK	\$1,300	MCDADE	\$0
COLEMAN (TX)	\$4,950	HANSEN	\$19,186	MCEWEN	\$2,500
COMBEST	\$5,500	HARRIS	\$700	MCMILLAN (NC)	\$5,950
CONDIT	\$5,650	HASTERT	\$8,379	MCMILLEN (MD)	\$0
COOPER	\$0	HATCHER	\$2,800	MICHEL	\$8,950
COSTELLO	\$2,350	HAYES (LA)	\$1,850	MILLER (OH)	\$250
COX	\$9,900	HEFLEY	\$1,650	MOLINARI	\$0
CRAIG	\$19,800	HEFNER	\$15,350	MOLLOHAN	\$9,700
CRANE	\$0	HERGER	\$10,750	MONTGOMERY	\$0
DANNEMEYER	\$350	HILER	\$7,450	MOORHEAD	\$600
DARDEN	\$6,950	HOLLOWAY	\$17,250	MORRISON (WA)	\$0
DAVIS	\$12,950	HOPKINS	\$3,500	MURPHY	\$3,250
DE LA GARZA	\$0	HORTON	\$0	MURTHA	\$5,950
		HOUGHTON	\$6,450	MYERS	\$0

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
NATCHER	\$0	SLATTERY	\$0	Voted Against the NRA	
NEAL (NC)	\$4,950	SLAUGHTER (VA)	\$0	position:	
NIELSON	\$0	SMITH (IA)	\$750	ACKERMAN	\$0
OBERSTAR	\$1,600	SMITH (NE)	\$5,050	ANDERSON	\$0
OBEY	\$8,150	SMITH (NH)	\$14,200	ANNUNZIO	\$0
OLIN	\$8,300	SMITH, R. (OR)	\$6,950	ATKINS	\$0
ORTIZ	\$4,950	SMITH, D. (OR)	\$13,900	AUCOIN	\$0
OWENS (UT)	\$15,350	SMITH (TX)	\$6,300	BATEMAN	\$0
OXLEY	\$0	SNOWE	\$800	BATES	\$0
PACKARD	\$5,000	SOLOMON	\$10,400	BEILENSON	\$0
PARKER	\$9,900	SPENCE	\$11,800	BENNETT	\$0
PARRIS	\$2,500	STAGGERS	\$7,300	BERMAN	\$0
PASHAYAN	\$6,200	STALLINGS	\$20,150	BONIOR	\$0
PATTERSON	\$500	STANGELAND	\$18,350	BORSKI	\$0
PAXON	\$13,900	STEARNS	\$5,870	BOSCO	\$0
PAYNE (VA)	\$2,850	STENHOLM	\$0	BOXER	\$0
PENNY	\$0	STUMP	\$6,750	BRENNAN	\$0
PERKINS	\$19,850	SUNDQUIST	\$7,750	BROOMFIELD	\$0
PETRI	\$850	SWIFT	\$500	BROWN (CA)	\$0
PICKETT	\$2,100	TALLON	\$3,400	BRYANT	\$0
PICKLE	\$0	TANNER	\$5,250	CAMPBELL (GA)	\$0
POSHARD	\$1,000	TAUKE	-0-	CARDIN	\$0
QUILLEN	\$30,750	TAUZIN	\$1,700	CARPER	\$0
RAHALL	\$4,950	TAYLOR	\$5,950	CHANDLER	\$0
RAVENEL	\$4,950	THOMAS (GA)	\$1,000	CLAY	\$0
RAY	\$350	THOMAS (WY)	\$0	COLEMAN (MO)	\$0
REGULA	\$0	THOMAS (CA)	\$1,000	COLLINS	\$0
RHODES	\$0	TRAXLER	\$5,450	CONTE	\$0
RICHARDSON	\$4,350	UDALL	\$0	CONYERS	\$0
RIDGE	\$1,350	UNSOELD	\$1,000	COUGHLIN	\$0
RITTER	\$250	UPTON	\$0	COURTER	\$0
ROBERTS	\$0	VALENTINE	\$500	COYNE	\$0
ROBINSON	\$15,850	VANDER JAGT	\$700	DELLUMS	\$0
ROGERS	\$0	VOLKMER	\$21,800	DEWINE	\$0
ROHRBACHER	\$5,250	VUCANOVICH	\$14,200	DICKS	\$0
ROSE	\$250	WALKER	\$600	DIXON	\$0
ROTH	\$13,700	WALSH	\$0	DONNELLY	\$0
ROWLAND (CT)	\$125	WATKINS	\$250	DOWNEY	\$0
ROWLAND (GA)	\$0	WEBER	\$14,600	DURBIN	\$0
SARPALIUS	\$9,900	WELDON	\$5,700	DWYER	\$0
SCHAEFER	\$11,100	WHITTAKER	\$950	DYMALLY	\$0
SCHIFF	\$9,250	WHITTEN	\$0	EARLY	\$0
SCHUETTE	\$17,950	WILLIAMS	\$5,950	EDWARDS (CA)	\$0
SCHULZE	\$4,100	WILSON	\$15,850	ENGEL	\$0
SENSENBRENNER	\$0	WISE	\$0	EVANS	\$250
SHARP	\$500	WYDEN	\$0	FASCELL	\$0
SHAW	\$500	YATRON	\$9,450	FAWELL	\$0
SHUMWAY	\$0	YOUNG (AK)	\$13,700	FAZIO	\$0
SHUSTER	\$10,556	YOUNG (FL)	\$2,000	FEIGHAN	\$0
SISISKY	\$850			FLAKE	\$0
SKEEN	\$5,900	Total	\$1,307,607	FOGLIETTA	\$0
SKELTON	\$1,500				

<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
FORD (TN)	\$0	MCDERMOTT	\$0	SERRANO	\$0
FRANK	\$0	MCGRATH	\$0	SHAYS	\$0
GEJDENSON	\$0	MCHUGH	\$0	SIKORSKI	\$0
GEPHARDT	\$0	MCNULTY	\$0	SKAGGS	\$0
GIBBONS	\$0	MEYERS	\$0	SLAUGHTER (NY)	\$0
GLICKMAN	\$0	MFUME	\$0	SMITH (FL)	\$0
GONZALEZ	\$0	MILLER (CA)	\$0	SMITH (NJ)	\$250
GOSS	\$3,000	MILLER (WA)	\$0	SMITH (VT)	\$250
GRADISON	\$0	MINETA	\$0	SOLARZ	\$0
GRAY	\$0	MINK	\$0	SPRATT	\$0
GREEN	\$0	MOAKLEY	\$0	STARK	\$0
GUARINI	\$0	MOODY	\$0	STOKES	\$0
HAYES (IL)	\$0	MORELLA	\$0	STUDDS	\$0
HENRY	\$0	MORRISON (CT)	\$0	SYNAR	\$0
HERTEL	\$0	MRAZEK	\$0	TORRES	\$0
HOAGLAND	\$0	NAGLE	\$500	TORRICELLI	\$0
HOCHBRUECKNER	\$0	NEAL (MA)	\$0	TOWNS	\$0
HOYER	\$0	NELSON	\$0	TRAFICANT	\$0
HUBBARD	\$3,700	NOWAK	\$0	VENTO	\$0
HUGHES	\$0	OAKAR	\$0	VISCLOSKEY	\$0
JOHNSON (CT)	\$0	OWENS (NY)	\$0	WALGREN	\$0
JOHNSTON (FL)	\$289	PALLONE	\$0	WASHINGTON	\$1,000
JONES (GA)	\$0	PANETTA	\$0	WAXMAN	\$0
KAPTUR	\$0	PAYNE (NJ)	\$0	WEISS	\$0
KASTENMEIER	\$0	PEASE	\$0	WHEAT	\$0
KENNEDY	\$0	PELOSI	\$0	WOLF	\$0
KENNELLY	\$0	PORTER	\$0	WOLPE	\$0
KILDEE	\$0	PRICE	\$0	WYLIE	\$0
KLECZKA	\$250	PURSELL	\$250	YATES	\$0
LAFALCE	\$0	RANGEL	\$0		
LANTOS	\$0	RINALDO	\$0	Total	\$27,589
LEACH	\$0	ROE	\$0		
LEHMAN (CA)	\$0	ROS-LEHTINEN	\$0	Not Voting	
LEHMAN (FL)	\$0	ROSTENKOWSKI	\$0		
LEVIN	\$0	ROUKEMA	\$0	CROCKETT	\$0
LEVINE	\$0	ROYBAL	\$0	EDWARDS (OK)	\$500
LEWIS (GA)	\$0	RUSSO	\$0	FOLEY	\$14,850
LIPINSKI	\$0	SABO	\$0	HAWKINS	\$0
LOWEY	\$0	SAIKI	\$8,750	MCCURDY	\$500
LUKEN	\$500	SANGMEISTER	\$0		
MACHTLEY	\$300	SAVAGE	\$0		\$15,850
MANTON	\$0	SAWYER	\$0		
MARKEY	\$0	SAXTON	\$0	Total NRA	
MATSUI	\$0	SCHEUER	\$0	Contributions:	\$1,351,046
MAVROULES	\$0	SCHNEIDER	\$0		
MAZZOLI	\$0	SCHROEDER	\$0		
MCCLOSKEY	\$8,300	SCHUMER	\$0		

APPENDIX V

UTILITY PACS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY

1. Action Committee for Rural **Electrification**
2. Action Committee for Rural **Electrification/Missouri** Cooperatives
3. Alabama Power Company Employees Federal Political Action Committee
4. American Electric Power Committee for Responsible Government; The American Public Power Association Public Ownership of Electric Resources Pac
5. Arizona Public Service Company Political Action Committee
6. Arkansas Power & Light Company Employees' Energy Political Action Committee
7. **AseaBrown Boveri** Employees' Fund for Effective Government
8. Atlantic City Electric Company Federal Political Action Committee
9. **Babcock & Wilcox** Company Good Government Fund; The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Political Action Committee
10. Basin Electric Power Cooperative **Political** Action Committee
11. Bechtel Group, Inc. Political Action Committee
12. Better Government Fund of **Mcdermott, Inc.**
13. Black Hills Power & Light Company Political Action Committee
14. Boston Edison Company Advocates of a Better Congress
15. **Centel** Corporation Good Government Fund
16. Centerior Fund a Political Action Committee of the Centerior Energy Corp.
17. Central and South West Services, Inc. Political Action Committee
18. Central Illinois Public Service Company Pac
19. Central Power and Light Company Political Action Committee
20. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Employee Federal Pac
21. Citizens for Responsible Government - Employees of the Montana Power Company
22. Colorado Advocates for Rural Electrification
23. Columbus Southern Power Company Political Action Committee
24. **Com/energy** Services Company Employees for a Responsible Congress
25. Committee for Accountable Government Interstate Power Company
26. Committee for Responsible Government-Dominion Resources, Inc.
27. Commonwealth Edison Political Action Committee
28. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Employees Political Action Committee
29. Consumers Power Company Employees for Better Government — Federal Cooperative Power Association Political Action Committee
30. Dayton Power and Light Company Employees' Fund for Responsible Citizenship
31. Detroit Edison Political Action Committee
32. DP & L Division of Texas Utilities Electric Company Active Citizenship Committee
33. Duquesne Light Company Federal Political Action Committee
34. Electric Employees Committee of the United Illuminating Company
35. Empire District Electric Company Political Action Committee
36. Employee Management Political Action Committee Mississippi Power & Light Company
37. Employees Federal Pac - Carolina Power & Light Company
38. Employees Federal Pac - Duke Power Company
39. Employees* Responsible Government Association of Delmarva Power & Light Company
40. Entergy Services, Inc. Good Government Action Committee
41. Epic/el Paso Electric Company
42. Federal Citizenship Responsibility Group
43. Frankfort Political Action Committee of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
44. General Atomics Political Action Committee
45. General Electric Company Political Action Committee

46. General Public Utilities Political Participation Association
47. Georgia Power Company Federal Pac, Inc.
48. Gilbert Associates, Inc. Political Action Committee
49. Good Government Management Association Florida Power & Light Company Employee's Pac
50. Gulf States Utilities Federal Political Action Committee
51. Henley Group, Inc. Employees Committee for Sensible Government
52. Houston Industries Political Action Committee
53. **Ida-pac** Political Action Committee
54. Illinois Power Employees' Federal Political Action Committee
55. Indiana Acre/Indiana Statewide Association of Rural Electric Cooperatives Inc.
56. Indiana Michigan Power Company Civic Action Program
57. Iowa Electric Light and Power Company Political Action Committee
58. Iowa Friends of Rural Electrification
59. Iowa Power Employee Political Action Committee Fka Iowa Resources Employee Pac
60. Iowa Public Service Company Employees Government Committee
61. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Political Action Committee
62. **K C Power Pac-Kansas** City Power & Light Company
63. Kansas Action Committee for Rural Electrification
64. Kansas Gas and Electric Company, Federal Political Action Committee
65. Kentucky Utilities Company Political Action Committee
66. KMS Fusion, Inc. Political Action Fund
67. **KPL Gas** Service Employees Political Action Committee
68. Louisiana Action Committee for Rural Electrification
69. Louisiana Employees Committee on Political Action of Louisiana Power & Light Company
70. MDU Resources Group, Inc. Political Action Committee
71. Minnesota Power Pac
72. Mississippi Acre Committee
73. Mississippi Power Company State Pac
74. Missouri Public Service Company Employee Pac
75. Montana Action Committee for Rural Electrification
76. N C Association of Electric Cooperatives Rural Electric Action Program
77. National Independent Energy Producers Pac
78. New England Electric Pac Established by New England Power Service Company
79. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. Committee for Responsible Government
80. New York State Electric & Gas Corporation Political Action Committee
81. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Management Voluntary Federal Political Action Committee
82. Northeast Utilities Political Action Committee
83. Northern Indiana Public Service Company Employees Political Action Committee
84. Northern States Power Employee Political Interest Committee
85. Ohio Edison Employee Federal Political Action Committee
86. Ohio Power Company **Political** Action Committee
87. Oklahoma Acre
88. Oklahoma Gas And Electric Company Employees Pac
89. Orange And **Rockland Utilities**, Inc. Employees' Political Action Committee
90. Oxford Energy Company Pac; The Pacific Gas Political Action Committee
91. Pacific Power & Light Employee Political Action Committee
92. Pekin Energy Employees' Political Action Committee
93. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company People for Good Government
94. Pennsylvania Power Company Employee Federal Political Action Committee
95. Philadelphia Electric Company Federal Political Action Committee
96. PNM Responsible Citizens Group
97. Political Action Committee of Florida Power Corporation Employees
98. Portland General Electric Employee **Bi-partisan** Committee
99. Potomac Electric Power Company Political Action Committee

100. Power Pac of the Edison Electric Institute
101. **PSI** Energy, Inc. Political Action Committee
102. Public Service Company of Colorado Political Action Committee
103. Public Service Company of New Hampshire Political Action Committee
104. Public Service Company of New Hampshire, New Hampshire Yankee Division Pac
105. Public Service Company of Oklahoma Political Action Committee
106. Public Service Electric and Gas Company Political Action Committee
107. Puget Power Good Government Committee
108. Responsible Government Committee of Gulf Employees, Inc.
109. Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation Employees' Federal Political Committee, Inc.
110. San Diego Gas & Electric Company Citizens for Good Government Committee
111. Scana Corporation Federal Political Action Committee
112. Sierra **Pacific** Employees Political Action Committee
113. Sierra Pacific Resources Committee for Good Government Political Action Committee
114. Solar Energy Industries Association Political Action Committee
115. Southern Company Services Pac
116. Southwestern Committee on Political Education For Southwestern Public Service Company
117. Southwestern Electric Power Company Political Action Committee
118. Speak Up for Rural Electrification
119. Systems Energy **Resources**, Inc. Employee Political Action Committee
120. Teco Energy, Inc. Employees' Pac
121. Tesco Division of Texas Utilities Electric Company Pac
122. Texas Utilities **Co/Texas** Utilities Electric Company and Service Companies Energy Employees Pac
123. Texas Utilities Company Political Action Committee
124. Texas Utilities Electric Company Division Employee Political Action Committee
125. Texas Utilities **Electric-Tugco** Division Political Action Committee
126. Texas-New Mexico Power Company Responsible Government Association
127. Toledo Edison Company Employee Federal Political Action Committee
128. Union Electric Company Employees Federal Political Action Committee
129. Union Oil (UNOCAL) Political Awareness Fund
130. United Employee Pac, Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc.
131. Utilicorp United, Inc. Employee Pac
132. Virginia Action Committee for Rural Electrification
133. Water Power Federal Political Action Committee
134. West Texas Utilities Company Political Action Committee
135. **Westinghouse** Electric Corporation Employees Political Participation Program
136. Wisconsin Electric Political Action Committee
137. Wisconsin Power And Light Employees' Political Action Committee
138. Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Responsible Government Committee

APPENDIX VI

INSURANCE PACS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY

1. A L Williams & Associates **Political** Action Committee, Inc.
2. Acacia Mutual Political Action Committee
3. Aetna Life and Casualty Company Political Action Committee
4. Aid Association for Lutherans Political Action Committee
5. Alliance of American Insurers Political Action Committee
6. Allied Mutual Insurance Company Political Action Committee
7. Allstate Insurance Company Political Action Committee
8. Ambase Corporation Political Action Committee
9. American Association of Crop Insurers Political Action Committee
10. American Council of Life Insurance, Life Insurance Pac
11. American Express Political Action Committee
12. American Family Corporation Political Action Committee
13. American Fidelity Corporation Pac
14. American General Political Action Committee
15. American Insurance Association Political Action Committee
16. American **International** Group, Inc. Employee Political Action Committee
17. American Mutual Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
18. American National **Insurance** Company Good **Government** Committee
19. American States Insurance Company Political Action Committee
20. American United Life Insurance Company Pac
21. Ameritas Financial Services Political Action Committee
22. **Amev** Holdings, Inc. Political Action Committee
23. Aon Corporation Political Action Committee
24. Associated Insurance Companies, Inc. Federal Political Action Committee
25. Associated Life Insurance Group National Policyholder Advisory Committee
26. **Beneficial Management** Corporation And Affiliated Corporations Political Action Committee
27. Blue Cross & Blue **Shield** of Connecticut, Inc. Pac
28. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin Political Action Committee
29. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Missouri Federal Government Affairs Committee
30. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia Federal Political Action Committee
31. Boat Owners Association of the United States Political Action Committee
32. Business Men's Assurance Company of America **Pac-federal**
33. Capital Holding Political Action Committee
34. Carepac of Kansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield
35. Carepac, The Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association Political Action Committee
36. Central Life Assurance Company Political Action Committee
37. Chubb Corporation Political Action Committee
38. Cigna Corporation Political Action **Committee**
39. Cna Financial Corporation Citizens for Good Government
40. Colonial Penn Political Action Committee
41. **Colpac** - The Political Action Committee of Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company
42. Common Sense Political Committee, Inc.
43. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co-political Action Committee
44. Continental Insurance Good Government Club
45. Corporate Citizenship Committee
46. Crown Life Brokerage General Agents Association Political Action Committee
47. **Crum** and **Forster**, Inc. Voluntary Political Action Committee
48. Crump Companies Political Action Committee
49. Delta Dental Plans Association Pac

50. Employers Mutual Casualty Company Committee for Responsible Federal Government
51. Equitable Financial Services Political Action Committee
52. **Erc** Corporation Public Affairs Program
53. Erie Indemnity Company **Pac-federal** (aka) Erie Insurance Pac and Erie Pac
54. Ethyl Corporation Political Action Committee
55. Farmers Group, Inc. Political Action Committee
56. Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company of Iowa Political Action Committee
57. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company-Fidelity Mutual Group, Inc. Federal Pac
58. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company Employees Committee for Responsible Government
59. Florida Health Political Action Committee
60. Franklin Life Employees' Campaign Fund
61. **Geico Pac**
62. General Accident Political Action Committee
63. General Agents Association Political Action Committee
64. General American Life Insurance Company Associates Federal Political Action Committee
65. Georgia U.S. Corporation Political Action Committee
66. Great-west Life Assurance Company Political Action Committee
67. **Grinnell** Mutual Reinsurance Company Political Action Committee
68. Guarantee Mutual Life Company Political Action Committee
69. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America Political Action Committee
70. Harleysville Insurance Political Action Committee
71. Hartford Insurance Group Political Action Committee
72. Health & People Political Action Committee of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan
73. Health Insurance Political Action Committee of the Health Insurance Association of America
74. Healthy Government Committee - The Political Action Committee/Blue Cross & Blue
Shield/Arizona
75. Home Life Insurance Company Federal Political Action Committee
76. Household International, Inc. & Subsidiary Companies Political Action Committee
77. Ids Political Action Committee
78. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. Political Action Committee
79. Insurance Association of Connecticut Political Action Committee
80. Integon Corporation Federal Political Action Committee
81. Jefferson-pilot Corporation Federal Good **Government** Committee Jefferson-pilot Fedpac
82. John D. Williams Pac
83. John Hancock Financial Services Pac
84. Kansas City Life Insurance Company Employees' Political Action Committee
85. Kansas Insurance Federal Political Action Committee
86. Kemper Group Campaign Fund
87. Liberty Corporation Federal Political Action Committee
88. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Political Action Committee
89. Lincoln National Corporation Political Action Committee
90. Loews **Corporation/Lorillard** Public Affairs Committee
91. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
92. MCM Corporation Political Action Committee
93. Merrill Lynch Political Action Committee
94. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Employees' Political Participation Fund A
95. Midwestern United Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
96. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company Pac
97. **MMI** Companies Political Action Committee
98. Modern Woodmen of America Political Action Committee
99. Monumental Political Action Committee
100. Mortgage Insurance Companies of America Political Action Committee
101. Mutual Benefit Life Federal Political Action Committee

102. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York Mony Political Action Committee
103. Mutual of Omaha Companies Pac
104. Mutual Trust Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee Mutual Trust Pac
105. National Association of Casualty & Surety Agents Political Action Committee (nacsapac)
106. National Association of Crop Insurance Agents Pac
107. National Association of Independent Insurers Political Action Committee
108. National Association of Insurance Brokers Political Action Committee
109. National Association of Life Companies Political Action Committee
110. National Association of Life Underwriters Political Action Committee
110. National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies Pac
111. National Structured Settlements Trade Association Political Action Committee
112. Nationwide Political Participation Committee
113. New England Mutual Life Insurance Company Pac/New England Life Pac
114. New York Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
115. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company Federal Political Action Committee
116. Northwestern National Life Insurance Company Federal Pac
117. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
118. Penn Mutual Political Action Committee
119. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company Pac Committee
120. Primerica Corporation Political Action Committee
121. Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company - Federal Political Action Committee
122. Professional Insurance Agents Political Action Committee
123. Protective Life Corporation Federal Political Action Committee
124. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company Political Action Committee
125. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
126. Prudential Insurance Company of America Federal Pac
127. Rebsamen Companies, Inc. Political Action Committee
128. Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. Political Action Committee
129. Royal Indemnity Company Voluntary Political Action Committee
130. **Safeco-pac**
131. Sears Political Action Committee
132. Security Benefit Group, Inc. Federal Political Action Committee
133. Security Life of Denver Insurance Company Political Action Committee
134. Shelter Insurance Federal Pac
135. Southland Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
136. St. Paul Companies, Inc. Volunteer Committee for Good Federal **Government**
137. Standard Insurance Company Political Action Committee
138. State Mutual Life Assurance Federal Political Action Committee
139. Team Xerox Political Action Committee
140. Textron, Inc. Political Action Committee
141. **Torchmark** Corporation Political Action Committee
142. Transamerica Corporation Political Action Committee
143. Transamerica Insurance Company Political Action Committee
144. Transamerica Life Companies Political Action Committee
145. Travelers Corporation Political Action Committee; The Union Central Life Insurance Company Political Action Committee
146. United Services Automobile Association Group Political Action Committee
147. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company Political Action Committee
148. **UNUM** Political Action Committee
149. **Utica** Mutual Insurance Company Insurance Executives Political Action Committee
150. Washington National Employees Political Action Fund of Washington National Insurance Company
151. Wausau Insurance Companies Political Action Committee-federal